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Abstract. The paper is devoted to game-theoretic methods for commu-
nity detection in networks. The traditional methods for detecting com-
munity structure are based on selecting denser subgraphs inside the net-
work. Here we propose to use the methods of cooperative game theory
that highlight not only the link density but also the mechanisms of clus-
ter formation. Specifically, we suggest two approaches from cooperative
game theory: the first approach is based on the Myerson value, whereas
the second approach is based on hedonic games. Both approaches allow to
detect clusters with various resolution. However, the tuning of the reso-
lution parameter in the hedonic games approach is particularly intuitive.
Furthermore, the modularity based approach and its generalizations can
be viewed as particular cases of the hedonic games.
Keywords: Network partitioning, community detection, cooperative games,
Myerson value, hedonic games.
1 Introduction
Community detection in networks or network partitioning is a very important
topic which attracted the effort of many researchers. Let us just mention several
main classes of methods for network partitioning. The first very large class is
based on spectral elements of the network matrices such as adjacency matrix
and Laplacian (see e.g., the survey [23] and references therein). The second class
of methods, which is somehow related to the first class, is based on the use of
random walks (see e.g., [1, 2, 6, 16, 18, 20] for the most representative works in
this research direction.) The third class of approaches to network partitioning is
based on methods from statistical physics [3, 21, 22]. The fourth class, which is
probably most related to our approach, is based on the concept of modularity
and its various generalizations [4, 9, 19, 24]. For a very thorough overview of the
community detection methods we recommend the survey [7].
In essence, all the above methods (may be with some exception of the statis-
tical physics methods), try to detect denser subgraphs inside the network and do
not address the question: what are the natural forces and dynamics behind the
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formation of network clusters. We feel that the game theory, and in particular,
cooperative game theory is the right tool to explain the formation of network
clusters.
In the present work, we explore two cooperative game theory approaches
to explain possible mechanisms behind cluster formation. Our first approach
is based on the Myerson value in cooperative game theory, which particularly
emphasizes the value allocation in the context of games with interactions be-
tween players constrained by a network. The advantage of the Myerson value is
in taking into account the impact of all coalitions. We use the efficient method
developed in [15] and [14] based on characteristic functions to calculate quickly
the Myerson value in the network. We would like to mention that in [14] a net-
work centrality measure based on the Myerson value was proposed. It might be
interesting to combine node ranking and clustering based on the same approach
such as the Myerson value to analyze the network structure.
The second approach is based on hedonic games, which are games explaining
the mechanism behind the formation of coalitions. Both our approaches allow
to detect clusters with varying resolution and thus avoiding the problem of the
resolution limit [8, 12]. The hedonic game approach is especially well suited to
adjust the level of resolution as the limiting cases are given by the grand coalition
and maximal clique decomposition, two very natural extreme cases of network
partitioning. Furthermore, the modularity based approaches can be cast in the
setting of hedonic games. We find that this gives one more, very interesting,
interpretation of the modularity based methods.
Some hierarchical network partitioning methods based on tree hierarchy, such
as [9], cannot produce a clustering on one resolution level with the number of
clusters different from the predefined tree shape. Furthermore, the majority of
clustering methods require the number of clusters as an input parameter. In
contrast, in our approaches we specify the value of the resolution parameter
and the method gives a natural number of clusters corresponding to the given
resolution parameter.
In addition, our approach easily works with multi-graphs, where several edges
(links) are possible between two nodes. A multi-edge has several natural interpre-
tations in the context of social networks. A multi-edge can represent: a number of
telephone calls; a number of exchanged messages; a number of common friends;
or a number of co-occurrences in some social event.
The paper is structured as follows: in the following section we formally define
network partitioning as a cooperative game. Then, in Section 3 we present our
first approach based on the Myerson value. The second approach based on the
hedonic games is presented in Section 4. In both Sections 3 and 4 we provide
illustrative examples which explain the essence of the methods. Finally, Section 5
concludes the paper with directions for future research.
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2 Network partitioning as a cooperative game
Let g = (N,E) denote an undirected multi-graph consisting of the set of nodes
N and the set of edges E. We denote a link between node i and node j as ij.
The interpretation is that if ij ∈ E, then the nodes i ∈ N and j ∈ N have
a connection in network g, while ij /∈ E, then nodes i and j are not directly
connected. Since we generally consider a multi-graph, there could be several
edges between a pair of nodes. Multiple edges can be interpreted for instance as
a number of telephone calls or as a number of message exchanges in the context
of social networks.
We view the nodes of the network as players in a cooperative game. Let
N(g) = {i : ∃j such that ij ∈ g}. For a graph g, a sequence of different nodes
{i1, i2, . . . , ik}, k ≥ 2, is a path connecting i1 and ik if for all h = 1, . . . , k − 1,
ihih+1 ∈ g. The length of the path l is the number of links in the path, i.e.
l = k−1. The length of the shortest path connecting i and j is distance between
i and j. Graph g on the set N is connected graph if for any two nodes i and j
there exists a path in g connecting i and j.
We refer to a subset of nodes S ⊂ N as a coalition. The coalition S is
connected if any two nodes in S are connected by a path which consists of nodes
from S. The graph g′ is a component of g, if for all i ∈ N(g′) and j ∈ N(g′),
there exists a path in g′ connecting i and j, and for any i ∈ N(g′) and j ∈ N(g),
ij ∈ g implies that ij ∈ g′. Let N |g is the set of all components in g and let g|S
is the subgraph with the nodes in S.
Let g − ij denote the graph obtained by deleting link ij from the graph g
and g + ij denote the graph obtained by adding link ij to the graph g.
The result of community detection is a partition of the network (N,E) into
subsets (coalitions) {S1, ..., SK} such that Sk∩Sl = ∅, ∀k, l and S1∪...∪SK = N .
This partition is internally stable or Nash stable if for any player from coalition
Sk it is not profitable to join another (possibly empty) coalition Sl. We also
say that the partition is externally stable if for any player i ∈ Sl for whom it is
benefitial to join a coalition Sk there exists a player j ∈ Sk for whom it is not
profitable to include there player i. The payoff definition and distribution will
be discussed in the following two sections.
3 Myerson cooperative game approach
In general, cooperative game of n players is a pair < N, v > where N =
{1, 2, . . . , n} is the set of players and v : 2N → R is a map prescribing for a
coalition S ∈ 2N some value v(S) such that v(∅) = 0. This function v(S) is the
total utility that members of S can jointly attain. Such a function is called the
characteristic function of cooperative game [13].
Characteristic function (payoff of coalition S) can be determined in different
ways. Here we use the approach of [10,11,14,15], which is based on discounting
directed paths. The payoff to an individual player is called an imputation. The
imputation in this cooperative game will be Myerson value [14, 15, 17].
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Let < N, v > be a cooperative game with partial cooperation presented by
graph g and characteristic function v. An allocation rule Y describes how the
value associated with the network is distributed to the individual players. Denote
by Yi(v, g) the value allocated to player i from graph g under the characteristic
function v.
Myerson proposed in [17] the allocation rule
Y (v, g) = (Y1(v, g), . . . , Yn(v, g)),
which is uniquely determined by the following two axioms:
A1. If S is a component of g then the members of the coalition S ought to
allocate to themselves the total value v(S) available to them, i.e ∀S ∈ N |g
∑
i∈S
Yi(v, g) = v (S) . (1)
A2. ∀g, ∀ij ∈ g both players i and j obtain equal payoffs after adding or
deleting a link ij,
Yi (v, g)− Yi (v, g − ij) = Yj (v, g)− Yj (v, g − ij) . (2)
Let us determine the characteristic function by the following way
vg (S) =
∑
K∈S|g
v (K) .
Then the Myerson value can be calculated by the formula
Yi (v, g) =
∑
S⊂N\{i}
(vg (S ∪ i)− vg (S))
s! (n− s− 1)!
n!
, (3)
where s = |S| and n = |N | .
Let us determine the characteristic function which is determined by the
scheme proposed by Jackson [11]: every direct connection gives to coalition S
the impact r, where 0 ≤ r ≤ 1. Moreover, players obtain an impact from indirect
connections. Each path of length 2 gives to coalition S the impact r2, a path of
length 3 gives to coalition the impact r3, etc. So, for any coalition S we obtain
v (S) = a1r + a2r
2 + · · ·+ akr
k + · · ·+ aLr
L =
L∑
k=1
akr
k, (4)
where L is a maximal distance between two nodes in the coalition; ak is the
number of paths of length k in this coalition. Set
v(i) = 0, ∀i ∈ N.
In [15] it was proven that the Myerson value can be found by the following
simple procedure of allocation the general gain v(N) to each player i ∈ N :
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Stage 1. Two direct connected players together obtain r. Individually, they
would receive nothing. So, each of them receives at least r/2. If player i has some
direct connections then she receives the value r/2 times the number of paths of
length 1 which contain the node i.
Stage 2. Three connected players obtain r2, so each of them must receive
r2/3, and so on.
Arguing this way, we obtain the allocation rule of the following form:
Yi (v, g) =
ai1
2
r +
ai2
3
r2 + · · ·+
aiL
L+ 1
rL =
L∑
k=1
aik
k + 1
rk, (5)
where aik is the number of all paths of length k which contain the node i.
Example 1. Consider network of six nodes presented in Fig. 1. Below we show
how to calculate characteristic function for different coalitions.
Fig. 1. Network of six nodes.
For the network N = {A,B,C,D,E, F} we find L = 3, a1 = 9, a2 = 4, a3 = 4.
Consequently, the value of grand-coalition is
v (N) = 9r + 4r2 + 4r3.
For coalition S = {A,B,C,D} we have L = 2, a1 = 5, a2 = 2 and we obtain
v (S) = 5r + 2r2.
This way we can calculate the values of characteristic function for all coalitions
S ⊂ N . After that we can find the Myerson vector.
Example 1 (ctnd). Let us calculate the Myerson value for player A in Ex-
ample 1 using the allocation rule (5). Mark all paths which contain node A.
The paths of length 1 are: {A,B}, {A,C}, {A,D}, hence aA1 = 3. The paths of
length 2 are: {B,A,C}, {B,A,D}, {C,A,D}, {A,D,E}, {A,D,F}, so aA2 = 5. The
paths of length 3: {B,A,D,E}, {B,A,D,F}, {C,A,D,E}, {C,A,D,F}, so aA3 = 4.
Consequently,
YA =
3
2
r +
5
3
r2 + r3.
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Thus, we can propose the following algorithm for network partitioning based
on the Myerson value: Start with any partition of the networkN = {S1, . . . , SK}.
Consider a coalition Sl and a player i ∈ Sl. In cooperative game with partial
cooperation presented by the graph g|Sl we find the Myerson value for player i,
Yi(g|Sl). That is reward of player i in coalition Sl. Suppose that player i decides
to join the coalition Sk. In the new cooperative game with partial cooperation
presented by the graph g|Sk ∪ i we find the Myerson value Yi(g|Sk ∪ i). So, if for
the player i ∈ Sl : Yi(g|Sl) ≥ Yi(g|Sk ∪ i) then player i has no incentive to join
to new coalition Sk, otherwise the player changes the coalition. The partition
N = {S1, . . . , SK} is the Nash stable if for any player there is no incentive to
move from her coalition. Notice that for unweighted graphs the definition of the
Myerson value implies that for any coalition it is always beneficial to accept a
new player (of course, for the player herself it might not be profitable to join
that coalition), the Nash stability (internal stability) in this game coincides with
the external stability.
Example 1 (ctnd). Let us clarify this approach on the network
N = {A,B,C,D,E, F}
presented in Fig. 1. Natural way of partition here is {S1 = (A,B,C), S2 =
(D,E, F )}. Let us determine under which condition this structure will present
the stable partition.
Suppose that characteristic function is determined by (4). For coalition S1
the payoff v(S1) = 4r. The payoff of player A is YA(g|S1) = r. Imagine that
player A decides to join the coalition S2.
Coalition S2 ∪ A has payoff v(S2 ∪ A) = 5r + 2r2. The imputation in this
coalition is YA(g|S2 ∪A) = r/2+ 2r
2/3, YD(g|S2 ∪A) = 3r/2+ 2r
2/3, YE(g|S2 ∪
A) = YF (g|S2 ∪ A) = 3r/2 + r2/3. We see that for player A it is profitable to
join this new coalition if r/2 + 2r2/3 > r, or r > 3/4. Otherwise, the coalitional
structure is stable.
Thus, for the network in Fig. 1 the Myerson value approach will give the
partition {S1 = (A,B,C), S2 = (D,E, F )} if r < 3/4 and, otherwise, it leads to
the grand coalition. This example already gives a feeling that the parameter r
can be used to tune the resolution of network partitioning. Such tuning will be
even more natural in the ensuing approach.
4 Hedonic coalition game approach
There is another game-theoretic approach for the partitioning of a society into
coalitions based on the ground-breaking work [5]. We apply the framework of
Hedonic games [5] to network partitioning problem, particularly, specifying the
preference function.
Assume that the set of players N = {1, . . . , n} is divided into K coalitions:
Π = {S1, . . . , SK}. Let SΠ(i) denote the coalition Sk ∈ Π such that i ∈ Sk.
A player i preferences are represented by a complete, reflexive and transitive
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binary relation i over the set {S ⊂ N : i ∈ S}. The preferences are additively
separable [5] if there exists a value function vi : N → R such that vi(i) = 0 and
S1 i S2 ⇔
∑
j∈S1
vi(j) ≥
∑
j∈S2
vi(j).
The preferences {vi, i ∈ N} are symmetric, if vi(j) = vj(i) = vij = vji for
all i, j ∈ N . The symmetry property defines a very important class of Hedonic
games.
As in the previous section, the network partitionΠ is Nash stable, if SΠ(i) i
Sk ∪ {i} for all i ∈ N,Sk ∈ Π ∪ {∅}. In the Nash-stable partition, there is no
player who wants to leave her coalition.
A potential of a coalition partition Π = {S1, . . . , SK} (see [5]) is
P (Π) =
K∑
k=1
P (Sk) =
K∑
k=1
∑
i,j∈Sk
vij . (6)
Our method for detecting a stable community structure is based on the fol-
lowing better response type dynamics:
Start with any partition of the networkN = {S1, . . . , SK}. Choose any player
i and any coalition Sk different from SΠ(i). If Sk ∪ {i} i SΠ(i), assign node i
to the coalition Sk; otherwise, keep the partition unchanged and choose another
pair of node-coalition, etc.
Since the game has the potential (6), the above algorithm is guaranteed to
converge in a finite number of steps.
Proposition 1. If players’ preferences are additively separable and symmetric
(vii = 0, vij = vji for all i, j ∈ N), then the coalition partition Π giving a local
maximum of the potential P (Π) is the Nash-stable partition.
One natural way to define a symmetric value function v with a parameter
α ∈ [0, 1] is as follows:
vij =


1− α, (i, j) ∈ E,
−α, (i, j) /∈ E,
0, i = j.
(7)
For any subgraph (S,E|S), S ⊆ N , denote n(S) as the number of nodes in
S, and m(S) as the number of edges in S. Then, for the value function (7), the
potential (6) takes the form
P (Π) =
K∑
k=1
(
m(Sk)−
n(Sk)(n(Sk)− 1)α
2
)
. (8)
We can characterize the limiting cases α→ 0 and α→ 1.
Proposition 2. If α = 0, the grand coalition partition ΠN = {N} gives the
maximum of the potential (8). Whereas if α → 1, some local maximum of (8)
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corresponds to a network decomposition into disjoint maximal cliques, given such
decomposition exists. (A maximal clique is a clique which is not contained in
another clique.)
Proof: It is immediate to check that for α = 0 the grand coalition partition
ΠN = {N} gives the maximum of the potential (8), and P (ΠN ) = m(N).
For values of α close to 1, the partition into maximal cliquesΠ = {S1, . . . , SK}
gives the maximum of (8). Indeed, assume that a player i from the clique SΠ(i)
of the sizem1 moves to a clique Sj of the sizem2 < m1. The player i ∈ SΠ(i) and
Sj are connected by at most m2 links. The impact on P (Π) of this movement
is not higher than
m2(1− α)− (m1 − 1)(1− α) ≤ 0.
Now, suppose that player i from the clique SΠ(i) moves to a clique Sj of the
size m2 ≥ m1. The player i ∈ SΠ(i) is connected with the clique Sj by at most
m2 − 1 links. Otherwise, it contradicts the fact that Π is maximal clique cover
and the clique Sj can be increased by adding of i. If i has an incentive to move
from SΠ(i) to the clique Sj , then for new partition the sum (8) would be not
higher than for partition Π by
m2 − 1−m2α− (m1 − 1)(1− α) = m2 −m1 − α(m2 −m1 + 1).
For α close to 1, this impact is negative, so there is no incentive to join the
coalition Sj .
The grand coalition and the maximal clique decomposition are two extreme
partitions into communities. By varying the parameter α we can easily tune the
resolution of the community detection algorithm.
Example 2. Consider graph G = G1 ∪G2 ∪G3 ∪G4, which consists of n = 26
nodes and m = 78 edges (see Fig. 2.) This graph includes 4 fully connected sub-
graphes: (G1, 8, 28) with 8 vertices connected by 28 links, (G2, 5, 10), (G3, 6, 15)
and (G4, 7, 21). Subgraph G1 is connected with G2 by 1 edge, G2 with G3 by 2
edges, and G3 with G4 by 1 edge.
Firstly, find the potentials (8) for large-scale decompositions of G for any
parameter α ∈ [0, 1]. It is easy to check, that P (G) = 78 − 325α, P ({G1, G2 ∪
G3∪G4}) = 77−181α, P ({G1, G2∪G3, G4}) = 76−104α, P ({G1, G2, G3, G4}) =
74− 74α.
Other coalition partitions give smaller potentials: P ({G1 ∪G2, G3 ∪G4}) =
76 − 156α < 76 − 104α, P ({G1 ∪ G2 ∪ G3, G4}) = 77 − 192α < 77 − 181α,
P ({G1, G2, G3 ∪ G4}) = 75− 116α < 76 − 104α, P ({G1 ∪ G2, G3, G4}) = 75−
114α < 76− 104α.
We solve a sequence of linear inequalities in order to find maximum of the
potential for all α ∈ [0, 1]. The result is presented in the table below.
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Fig. 2. Graph with four fully connected subgraphs.
Nash-stable coalition partitions in Example 2.
α coalition partition potential
[0, 1/144] G1 ∪G2 ∪G3 ∪G4 78− 325α
[1/144, 1/77] G1, G2 ∪G3 ∪G4 77− 181α
[1/77, 1/15] G1, G2 ∪G3, G4 76− 104α
[1/15, 1] G1, G2, G3, G4 74− 74α
Example 1 (ctnd). Note that for the unweighted version of the network ex-
ample presented in Fig. 1, there are only two stable partitions: Π = N for small
values of α ≤ 1/9 and Π = {{A,B,C}, {D,E, F}} for α > 1/9.
Example 3. Consider the popular example of the social network from Zachary
karate club (see Fig. 3). In his study [25], Zachary observed 34 members of a
karate club over a period of two years. Due to a disagreement developed between
the administrator of the club and the club’s instructor there appeared two new
clubs associated with the instructor (node 1) and administrator (node 34) of
sizes 16 and 18, respectively.
The authors of [9] divide the network into two groups of roughly equal size
using the hierarchical clustering tree. They show that this split corresponds
almost perfectly with the actual division of the club members following the
break-up. Only one node, node 3, is classified incorrectly.
Let us now apply the hedonic game approach to the karate club network.
We start from the final partition N = {S15, S19}, which was obtained in [9]. We
calculate the potential for grand-coalition P (N) = 78 − 561α and for partition
P (S15, S19) = 68− 276α. From the equation P (N) = P (S15, S19) we obtain the
cutoff point α = 2/57. So, if α < 2/57, P (N) is larger than P (S15, S19), so
partition {S15, S19} is not Nash-stable. For α = 2/57 the potential increases if
the node 3 moves from S19 to S15. For the new partition P (S16, S18) = 68−273α.
Comparing with potential of the grand coalition we obtain α = 5/144. For α =
5/144 the potential increases if the node 10 moves to S16. Now P (S17, N \S17) =
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Fig. 3. Zachary karate club network.
68− 272α and the new cutoff point is α = 10/289. Finally, in order to find the
upper bound of the resolution parameter, we have to check that for any player
there is no incentive to move from her coalition to the empty coalition.
Thus, for 1/16 ≥ α ≥ 10/289 the Nash-stable partition is
S17 = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 17, 18, 20, 22}∪ {N \ S17}.
Notice that in this new partition the node 3 belongs to the “right” coaltion.
Another natural approach to define a symmetric value function is, roughly
speaking, to compare the network under investigation with the configuration
random graph model. The configuration random graph model can be viewed as
a null model for a network with no community structure. Namely, the following
value function can be considered:
vij = βij
(
Aij − γ
didj
2m
)
, (9)
where Aij is a number of links between nodes i and j, di and dj are the degrees
of the nodes i and j, respectively, m = 1
2
∑
l∈N dl is the total number of links in
the network, and βij = βji and γ are some parameters.
Note that if βij = β, ∀i, j ∈ N and γ = 1, the potential (8) coincides with the
network modularity [9,19]. If βij = β, ∀i, j ∈ N and γ 6= 1, we obtain the general-
ized modularity presented first in [22]. The introduction of the non-homogeneous
weights was proposed in [24] with the following particularly interesting choice:
βij =
2m
didj
.
The introduction of the resolution parameter γ allows to obtain clustering with
varying granularity and in particular this helps to overcome the resolution limit
[8].
Thus, we have now a game-theoretic interpretation of the modularity func-
tion. Namely, the coalition partition Π = {S1, . . . , SK} which maximises the
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modularity
P (Π) =
K∑
k=1
∑
i,j∈Sk,i6=j
(
Aij −
didj
2m
)
(10)
gives the Nash-stable partition of the network in the Hedonic game with the
value function defined by (9), where γ = 1 and βij = β.
Example 1 (ctnd). For the network example presented in Fig. 1 we calculate
P (N) = 3/2, P ({B,C}∪{A,D}∪{E,F}) = P ({A,B,C,D}∪{E,F}) = 7/2 and
P ({A,B,C} ∪ {D,E, F}) = 5. Thus, according to the value function (9) with
γ = 1 and βij = β (modularity value function), Π = {{A,B,C}, {D,E, F}} is
the unique Nash-stable coalition.
Example 3 (ctnd). Numerical calculations show that the partition S17 ∪ {N \
S17} gives the maximum of potential function (10). It means that this partition
is Nash stable.
5 Conclusion and future research
We have presented two cooperative game theory based approaches for network
partitioning. The first approach is based on the Myerson value for graph con-
strained cooperative game, whereas the second approach is based on hedonic
games which explain coalition formation. We find the second approach espe-
cially interesting as it gives a very natural way to tune the clustering resolution
and generalizes the modularity based approaches. Our near term research plans
are to test our methods on more social networks and to develop efficient com-
putational Monte Carlo type methods.
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